In the following lines I am going to outline an imaginary alternative for a potential negotiation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. I must first clarify that, although my profession is that of a conflict mediator – not warlike conflicts but nevertheless of a certain political and social complexity – the data that informs my analysis, in addition to my own professional knowledge, is none other than that which can be accessed by any citizen with a certain level of curiosity.

Before I begin, I must also make it expressly clear that the opinions I present here are purely personal and must not in any way be considered as the opinions of any organization with which I am currently professionally associated, or have been associated in the past.

Let us begin.

I will start by stating the obvious. The conflict is at a standstill. The parties, through various strategies, have managed to match their forces in such a way that neither can do anything but continue to inflict punctual damage to the other, which by itself is not sufficient to generate substantive changes in the situation, but only to say to each other, “I am here, I will remain here, and I will not falter even for a moment.” While Ukraine managed to take over Kherson and recover part of the territory invaded by Russia, the latter, for its part, has devastated the electric infrastructure, as we can see from the newspapers. Where one makes a breakthrough on one flank, the other makes a breakthrough on another.

Neither have the attempts at negotiation shown any progress whatsoever. The closest the parties came to something resembling a hopeful beginning of a dialogue was when, with the help of the Turkish government as mediator, there was talk of offering the occupied areas some kind of self-determination mechanism as well as guarantees of neutrality on the Ukrainian side. That attempt was put to naught when mass graves were discovered in Bucha with a multitude of bodies of Ukrainian civilians.

Therefore, yes, the conflict and possible negotiations for its solution are at a standstill.

The next question to ask, then, is whether this stalemate will continue or may change at some point in the future. Although the popular Spanish saying states that no conflict lasts for “100 years”, we will try to bring some theoretical structure to the conversation.

An – overly – simple scheme that attempts to explain the dynamics of conflict states that the phases through which conflict usually passes are: latency of conflict, emergence, escalation, stagnation, de-escalation, negotiation, agreement, peace. For professionals in the field of conflict management, this description in terms of phases helps us to determine what type of strategies or interventions should be adopted for each phase. Thus, for the initial stages, where the conflict begins to emerge, we speak of preventive diplomacy; when the conflict has broken out and begins to escalate, we speak of peacekeeping efforts (understood as a kind of “cooldown”, normally through military forces) and when the conflict enters the resolution phase, we speak of peace-building efforts, i.e. a whole series of both peace-building and peace consolidation strategies, including those of reconciliation.

I said before that this scheme is overly simple. It is a useful framework in that it helps to easily visualize the phases of a conflict, but it is too simple because it prevents us from seeing that the reality may be somewhat more complex. If all conflicts followed this staged process where the moment the conflict reaches the peak of escalation and explosion, the downward stage of resolution begins, situations such as those of Israel and Palestine, Syria, or Afghanistan, to name but a few, would have long since begun the path to peaceful resolution via negotiation.

And we know that this is not the case.

A truer image would be obtained by picturing the development of a conflict, rather than as a hill that is climbed and then descended, as the ascent of a mountain like Mount Everest, which allows stops in camps. These camps are reached when the parties are exhausted after a very intense moment of confrontation. It is in these spaces that they may be willing to consider avenues of negotiation. In conflict negotiation these moments are called “valley moments”.

If at one of these stops the parties manage to make sustainable progress through negotiation, they will proceed to begin the descent of the mountain. Conversely, if they do not succeed, then they will proceed to continue up the mountain, increasing the levels of commitment and destruction, in the hope that the next camp or stop will once again open up an opportunity for dialogue, one that suits their interests. The problem is that, as with high mountains, the higher up the pitches or stops, the riskier and more difficult these spaces become. In other words, escalation, in addition to increasing the damage to the parties, increases the agenda of issues to be resolved because new grievances accumulate on top of the previous ones.

To understand conflicts, it is also necessary to understand that in every conflict there is a force or dynamic that comes into play. This particular one is called “irrational escalation of commitment”. According to this dynamic, the costs that conflicts generate – be it in the form of economic losses, time, energy, but also human lives, material assets etc. – far from encouraging the parties to reconsider their combative impulses, make them multiply their efforts and investment in the conflict.

In every conflict, whether private, public, or international, we must constantly answer the question of how much more we are willing to invest in the conflict. This question resurfaces at each new stage or level of escalation and the answer will differ from those given on the last occasions it was raised.

Returning to the simile of climbing a mountain: Whatever costs or investment we told ourselves we would be willing to accept in a conflict at base camp has absolutely nothing to do with what we tell ourselves we are willing to accept at camps 1, 2, 3, and beyond. The effort we invest in a conflict tends to rise “irrationally” as we move through it without resolving it. Why is that? Why are we so “irrational”? Because, like anyone who gambles in a casino or the stock market, we can fall into the trap of trying to recoup our past losses with further investments. The more losses, the more we need to invest to recover from them, but the more we may continue to lose as well. In the absence of a “stop-loss” system, these losses can reach levels that were unimaginable at the beginning of the “game”. That is why we say that no conflict is small, because any small conflict, if not resolved, can escalate indefinitely.

The fact that the conflict has a public dimension also plays an intensifying role in the context of this “multiplying factor”. The eyes and judgments of third parties increase the intensity of the conflict and make its resolution more complicated.

The combination of the irrational escalation of commitment, together with the public dimension of the conflict, is what makes it almost impossible for the leaders who initiated – or took the initiative to counter-attack – a conflict to also be the ones agreeing to make concessions during an eventual negotiation process.

For such a leader, it will be very problematic to ask his people, those who made sacrifices, including those of lives, to accept something that may appear as a “middle ground” and not a total victory. For this reason, usually those who were the great heroes of combat cannot, simultaneously, be the great heroes of peace.

In a military conflict, this means that if a ruler starts a conflict and, as a result of its first stages, lives are lost, far from stopping its advance and thinking, “Be careful, this conflict is more dangerous than it initially appeared, we should not go down that path”, they will try to justify themselves by saying that efforts and investments must be redoubled. The problem is that the first losses on both sides force them to increase investment and, therefore, to generate a clash on a larger scale. Both leaders are trapped in the same escalation path.

I hope that, with the above information, it has become clear that, first, conflicts can be scandalous and brutally dangerous whatever the stage they are in, and, second, if today we say, “Oh, well, A or B is not going to happen,” tomorrow we will see it as something widely accepted and normalized.

So, what to do? Three things. Not separately, but in parallel, since separately they are of little use.

One. Work towards a power equilibrium. In the case of Ukraine-Russia, it appears that this is being achieved. Ukraine alone could never have matched Russia’s military and economic power. To match Russia’s power without extending the battlefield into Russian territory, with a few exceptions, borders on heroism.

Two. Work towards a negotiated solution to the conflict, seizing the opportunities of the valley moments. This is clearly not being achieved in the case of Ukraine-Russia. And it is on this part that I will focus my analysis.

Three. Bring third parties to the negotiation. Third parties can help reduce and manage the above-mentioned risks.

As far as we know – again, only from what we read in the newspapers – the negotiation attempts, except for an initial one mentioned above and facilitated by Erdogan, have been extremely poor. In fact, the parties are not making any concessions, as one would expect in a negotiating process, and what they are calling “negotiation” is merely an invitation for the other party to capitulate. The positions of the parties leave very little room for negotiation.

This brings us to the next important aspect of effective negotiation.

An essential conceptual aspect of any effective negotiation process is trying to determine the underlying motivations of parties. And I am expressly highlighting the word “underlying”.

In negotiation theory, the distinction between position and interests is a classic one. For those who have not yet come across the concept: Position refers to what we wish to obtain in a conflict or negotiation; by contrast, interest, also known as motivation, refers to why we wish to obtain it. There is a reason why I label motivations as “underlying.” Often, the motivations underlying a position are not obvious. Either because the conflicting parties feel that revealing their motivations might make them vulnerable, or because the motivations lack legitimacy, parties tend to hide their true motivations. The problem with approaching conflict only from the perspective of positions – and the opportunity if done from that of motivations – remains that negotiating positions tends to be a zero-sum game, whereas – and this is where the opportunity arises – negotiating motivations always creates more options for all involved.

The challenge, then, is to uncover motivations without making the parties feel vulnerable in doing so.

In the case of the Donbass and the occupied regions of Ukraine, position refers to the territory in question. Both parties share the same position. Both want the same territory. It is a zero-sum game. The problem, though, is that positions do not tell us anything about motivations.

In the case of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, motivations are somewhat easier to interpret, at least from a western perspective. According to the Ukrainian version of the conflict, Ukraine’s main motivation is to regain territory that rightfully belongs to it. A related motivation is to also assert its right to self-determination as a country. If Ukraine wants to move closer to the western and European bloc, it should be free to do so. This is a version widely supported, not only by Ukraine, but also by the whole western bloc that stands behind it. Likewise, other countries such as China, Turkey, etc. do not doubt that these territories rightfully belong to Ukraine.

Russia’s motivations, in the way they reach us in Western countries, are more difficult to identify. There are many theories. I will present a short list, which is not meant to be exhaustive.

– Russia, in a move driven by imperialist whims, wishes to reclaim Ukraine for itself, because it considers that it should never have existed as an independent country in the first place. Those claiming that this is Russia’s real motivation support it by pointing out that, at the beginning of the invasion, the Russian troops tried to reach Kiev, indicating that they did not intend to limit themselves to the territories they currently occupy and are trying to occupy.

–  Another version states that Russia seeks to take over the territories of Donbass in order to protect, once and for all, the Russophone populations living in those territories. This version is substantiated by alleged acts of violence and alleged denial of rights to Russian citizens, exercised by Ukrainian Neo-Nazi groups. This interpretation would be in line with the demands for respect for the identities of other minorities living in Ukraine, such as the populations of Romania and other countries bordering Ukraine. This allegation is also sustained by incidents, some very serious, such as the fire in Odessa of a building occupied by Russofone citizens, in which, according to some accounts, up to 150 people were killed. In addition, there is the fact that the government that overthrew Viktor Yanukovych also abolished the law on the co-officiality of minority languages. These repeated incidents and grievances are said to have caused immense outrage among the ethnically Russian and Russophone populations living in the Donbass and the Crimea. According to this interpretation, then, Russia is only coming to the rescue of its own.

– The other theory is that this “operation” is part of a broader battle between the European Union countries, NATO, and Russia. In this view, the objective of the Russian invasion would have been, at least in its beginnings, to try to prevent the Ukrainian government from taking a pro-European drift, and therefore, possibly, a pro-NATO one as well.

According to this theory, the origin of the problem lies not so much in the suffering of the Russian population at the hands of alleged Ukrainian ultra-right-wing groups as in the Euromaidan protests, during which President Yanukovich – a Putin sympathizer – attempted to repeal a law that brought Ukraine closer to the European Union. The uprising against Yanukovich was not to the liking of Putin’s regime and, consequently, the aim of their invasion was to try, as they had already done in Georgia, to enter the country and forcibly achieve two objectives: one, to segregate those provinces that border Russia and, two, to impose a government aligned with Russian interests, the main interest of this intervention being to steer Ukraine away from any attempt to join Europe, and NATO.

If the latter objective were true, the Russian objective of preventing Ukraine from moving closer to NATO would place the whole problem in the realm of security and defense concerns/motivations.

Which of these theories might be true? It is difficult to know. To begin with, these three theories of motivations – imperialism, protection of Russophone populations, and security concerns – are not mutually exclusive. They are not equally legitimate, of course, but neither are they mutually exclusive.

The imperialist theory becomes a reality when one country feels it has the right to invade another, reach its capital, and enforce a change of government and/or a segregation of its territory. The theory of the invasion being a means of protecting the Russophone populations should not be discarded either, since part of the population of the conquered regions has joined the efforts of the Russian army – without forgetting, of course, that another large part of the population has not.

Finally, the Russian army’s entry – at least as it was initially designed – into Ukraine is not incompatible either with an alleged need to distance Ukraine from the European Union or, rather, from the European Union and NATO.

What other elements of analysis do we have to determine Russia’s interests? This question could lead to a never ending debate. However, I will concentrate on what the average news reader can conclude, while also presenting those sources that I consider most valuable in getting an idea of Russian motivations.

The first source of “evidence” comes from China’s statements regarding the conflict. China has made very few statements on the subject. When it did, its first brief message was, “The territorial integrity of a country is something that should not be violated.” This message was complemented and nuanced by another message stating that the security needs of countries – in reference to Russia – must be addressed. This message, coming from China, Russia’s ally, should be carefully analyzed. China is telling us something that Russia cannot afford to say publicly: that it needs greater security.

The second source, which is something all mediators always try to examine, is that of past – and failed – attempts to negotiate the issues. What did the parties propose, how far did the negotiation progress, what caused it to fail? These are questions whose answers provide a very valuable indication of the parties’ possible motivations.

We know that Russian and Ukrainian delegations met during the initial stages of the conflict. That attempt at negotiation – which both sides claimed was on the right track, initially – was frustrated by the news Ukraine received about what happened in Bucha, causing it to abandon the negotiating table. However, we can use what we know about that attempt as an aid to interpreting Russia’s intentions at the time. The points of those talks were:

– for Russia to withdraw from the invaded areas – except Crimea

– for Ukraine to remain neutral and not to apply for NATO membership

– for the question of Crimea to be postponed but retaken by the parties after a certain number of years (the ball was “kicked forward,” as we say in Spain)

– for a procedure aiming at self-determination for the invaded areas to be initiated.

Based on these points of tentative agreement, it seems clear that during these talks the security/defense issue was at the heart of the solutions explored.

At this point, further probing into the underlying motivations could be an endless endeavor. The focus of the analysis can range from historical, to political, sociological and even to psychological factors, whichever we like. The challenge is to not limit the problem too much in order to avoid oversimplification, but also to not get lost in factors that lead us away from a practical plan. At the risk of straying slightly from a practical discussion, I will add one final point of analysis. One which the average Westerner will have greater trouble empathizing with, but which Russians will probably endorse immediately.

I call this element the historico-geographical psychological factor.

The “recent” history gives account of two recent historical facts which are, as I interpret it, deeply rooted in the worldview of Russian citizens. I am referring to the two great invasions of Russian territory by foreign countries: first, the Napoleonic forces, and second, the Nazi invasion. Yes, to many it will seem that these two historical events are completely behind us and therefore do not allow any connection with the events of the present. This view, however, would mean ignoring Russian psychology. Of the eight Russian national holidays, four are in commemoration of the repulse of invading forces. Prominent among these celebrations is Victory Day, which commemorates the hugely traumatic victory over Nazi forces. While it appears that the rest of the world has overcome the trauma of World War II, in the psyche of Russians – with the help of constant reminders from the state – the trauma of the Nazi invasion is still present.

As for the geographical component of that element, my suggestion is to take a look at topographic maps. One can see at first glance that the entire territory from Germany to Moscow is an uninterrupted plain. There are virtually no physical obstacles between the Carpathians and the Ural Mountains. What borders exist between the various countries occupying these plains are purely political, not physical. This can increase the perceived vulnerability of populations on both sides of borders. Given that the Pyrenees clearly separate France from Spain and the oceans make the United States and Great Britain less vulnerable, it is reasonable to think that the lack of these physical obstacles contributes to a country’s perception of vulnerability.

By combining the geographical factor with the historic-psychological one, we can at least imagine how Russians might perceive their borders with NATO countries as fragile, always remembering that to many, NATO equals the United States, that is, Russia’s biggest opponent.

One indication of that fragility in the borders, and the anxiety that comes with it, is the reactions to the conflict in countries such as Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia. Their reactions to Russia’s invasion have been amongst the most vigorous and committed to one solution only: the defeat of the invader.

Finally, with regard to the question of motivations, in a way, the war in Ukraine must also be read in terms of a clash of international super powers. The support of the United States is being decisive in the defense of Ukraine’s – legitimate – interests. But its intervention has also placed the conflict on the chessboard of global geopolitical competition, which makes the issue even more difficult. The public dimension of the conflict has made it so that, much as if the public were watching a game of chess, the stakes are not only the fate of Ukraine but also determining who will emerge stronger or weaker on the global geopolitical scene. This fact is detrimental to the possibility of a solution for Ukraine, because, in a way, the decision of its fate lies in the hands of interests and power dynamics that are outside its sphere of influence.

I would like to pause here for a moment.

In conflicts, especially if we are close to or sympathetic to one of the parties, any exercise of going beyond our own perceptions will inevitably lead to an uncomfortable moment. One that can also be perceived as extremely dangerous. It is the moment when our “truths” about a situation, a person or a group of people are called into question. A time when we seem to be asked to alter our values, the things we care about, our view of the grievances we have suffered. A time when it seems that all our sacrifices and pains are about to be belittled and discarded. A time that seems to call for the completely unjustified actions of our enemies to be justified. This is not what I propose here.

Yes, I am proposing to question our own assumptions about the motivations of the other side, but I am not advocating to justify them. My suggestion is to separate the actions from the motivations. The invasion of Ukraine is the action. An action that must continue to be resisted, tenaciously. This is not incompatible with the opening of parallel routes in search of solutions that would put an end to the conflict. For such a parallel route, disconnected from the military arena, to be successful, it needs to provide proposals that meet the needs of the parties, and to this end, it is necessary to make an effort to interpret them.

In indicating that, from Russia’s particular perspective, Russia’s actions may be a defensive pre-emptive strike connected to local and international security needs, I am not justifying its actions. I am not justifying the invasion of Ukrainian borders or the attacks on schools, hospitals and mass killings of civilians. The people behind these actions must face their consequences and stand trial. My proposal is threefold; 1) to continue to defend Ukrainian sovereign territories using military power, 2) to use international mechanisms to prosecute the Russian government for the way it has conducted the war, and 3) in parallel, only in parallel, to explore options for a dialogue that addresses the “underlying” needs and at least puts an end to the killings on both sides.

This analysis will only attempt to address the third of these strategies. My suggestion would never include ceasing or pausing defensive combat. In fact, when I read proposals calling for a cease-fire, I doubt very much that this is the right approach. In my view, for dialogue to succeed in the current circumstances, it must occur in parallel with uninterrupted resistance.

So, let us return to the third strategy, that of trying to understand each other’s motivations. First, I would like to pose the following question: Has empathy ever helped to end or prevent war, or, conversely, has empathy created additional risks?

There are examples of both.

An extraordinary example where humanity dodged nuclear disaster by resorting to empathy is provided by the Cuban missile crisis. I will not dwell too much on this example, but it is one of a situation in which one side, the Americans, saw the installation of missiles in Cuba aimed at the USA as an aggression and a threat of enormous gravity that they were prepared to repel with all their might, while the other, Cuba, saw in those missiles – obtained with Russian support – a necessary defense against an immensely powerful and threatening neighbor. In that situation, thanks to a Kennedy advisor who dared to propose that a solution could be reached through dialogue, both sides wisely restrained their impulses and replaced them with mutually acceptable pacts. The exchange, as we know, consisted of offering security guarantees to Cuba that the US invasion attempts would not be repeated, and measures to offer greater security to Russia, through the withdrawal of the missiles installed in Turkey that were aimed at it.

It took a great deal of courage – and risk-taking – on both sides, Russians and Americans, to refrain from pulling the trigger and to substitute mutually acceptable pacts for actions of aggression/defense.

The counter-example, where dialogue only increased risks and delayed solutions, was the Munich talks between British Prime Minister Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler. It is well known that these talks and pacts were nothing but a strategy of deception by the Nazis.

So what is to be done, how do we distinguish between using empathy as a tool for peace and putting ourselves at the even greater risk of falling into its potential trap? As I have said before, as long as military force can guarantee sufficient resilience to Ukraine, the risks of exploring empathy and Russia’s motivations, while not nil, are mitigated.

It is time to move on to the solutions section. I will now offer some possible solution scenarios.

Solution to Russia’s interests to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of minority populations living in the occupied regions. Europe’s role is critical in achieving this solution. If Ukraine wants to be eligible to join the European Union, it must demonstrate that it is capable of protecting human rights, particularly those of minorities. Measures taken to protect these minorities – including perhaps an eventual right to self-determination – must be monitored by both the European Union and the Russian Federation. Russia could also contribute to this solution by offering Russian-speaking citizens Russian citizenship, should they prefer to emigrate to the vast territories of Russia.

Solutions to Russia’s interests – and those of Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, etc. – to improve security.

– Ukraine shall be free to join NATO. That does not mean that it will do so, but as a free country it should be free to opt for that possibility.

– A DMZ (demilitarized zone) shall be established along the Russian-Ukrainian border and the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. A demilitarized zone is an area in which, by international treaties, military facilities, activities or personnel are prohibited. Currently, there are 11 zones in the world treated as demilitarized zones. The DMZ will aim to stabilize the border. The size of the DMZ is to be determined by agreement between the parties, but the principle behind the DMZ is for it to extend equally on both sides of the border, meaning that if it goes X kilometers into Ukrainian territory, it will go the same distance into Russian/Belarusian territory.

– A strategy and a UN peacekeeping task force will be deployed to oversee the implementation of the DMZ. Activities of this task force could include deploying security forces on the ground or, alternatively, remote monitoring through the use of satellites and early-warning mechanisms. The UN peacekeeping task force should be composed of non-partisan countries, namely Turkish, Indian and Brazilian forces. This would be a good opportunity for demonstrating that, at times like these, the South can come to the support of the North.

– Funding for this task force will come in equal parts from the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union.

– Following the establishment of the demilitarized zone, a de-escalation and transition plan leading to the removal of the DMZ will be negotiated.

– The fate of the Crimean peninsula will be included in the DMZ de-escalation talks but not make the fate of the occupied regions conditional to a global solution that would include Crimea.

– If Ukraine eventually joins NATO, it will do so in a way that provides assurances to Russia that such a move will not include increased threats to the Russian Federation. This can be achieved by agreeing not to resort to deploying certain military assets or activities on Ukrainian territory. Such agreements should include guarantees and third-party monitoring measures. Again, here the monitoring of third parties shall be crutial.

– Finland will contribute to the peace talks by freezing its application for NATO membership. If the peace talks progress, Finland will withdraw its application, otherwise it will continue with its application for membership.

– Parallel to these measures and as part of the de-escalation strategy following the implementation of the DMZ zone, the US and Russia, with the support of third parties, will engage in talks on how to address their shared security needs.

– The European Union will decide what role to play in these discussions.

– An international body will be formed to investigate war crimes committed during combat. This international body will make its findings public and will order and demand reparations from those found to be responsible.

Surely, in the eyes of many, these proposals are sound. In the eyes of many others, they won’t be. My only hope is that those who see some promise in them will make an effort to work on adapting or refining them.

All parties to a conflict must decide what role they wish to play: Do they stand aside, do they side with one party, do they roll up their sleeves to help find solutions?

As many conflicts have demonstrated in the past – Afghanistan, Vietnam, etc. – conflicts are unpredictable. The longer they go unresolved, the less public support they receive. One day, the leader who used to be seen as the savior comes to be seen as part of the problem.

One question the world’s leaders should ask themselves is: Do they wish to be inspired by Khrushchev’s and Kennedy’s determination to find peaceful ways to resolve their differences and make the world a safer place for all?

Paco Gimenez-Salinas
Compliance and dispute resolution specialist