Abstract: The Brussels IIb Regulation has transformed the child’s right to be heard from a primarily domestic procedural issue into a matter of cross-border relevance. In Hungary, this development has brought renewed attention to the concept of ítélőképesség, traditionally translated as the child’s capacity to form views. The article examines how Hungarian law and judicial practice assess this capacity and whether the existing approach sufficiently reflects the child-rights-based standards of European family law. The child’s capacity to form views should be understood as a subjective and situational concept requiring individual assessment in each concrete case. As with fault capacity, the same minor child may possess such capacity in relation to one decision, while lacking it in relation to another. It is therefore not a general or abstract attribute of the child, but a decision-specific ability linked to the particular decision-making situation and to the specific issue at stake. From a child-rights-based perspective, it is necessary to move beyond the traditional age-centred approach to capacity and to place greater emphasis on the child’s actual ability to form and express views in the individual case. Age should primarily be relevant not to the existence of the child’s capacity to form views, but to the assessment of the weight to be attached to the views expressed by a child who possesses that capacity.

Key words: child’s right to be heard, child’s right to express views, capacity to form views, parental responsibility, Brussels IIb Regulation, Hungarian family law, judicial practice

Introduction

At the international and European levels, children’s rights do not constitute an autonomous branch of law, nor does there exist a separate codification exclusively dedicated to children’s rights. Children’s rights permeate the legal system as a whole[1]; they are multifaceted and complex in nature and affect numerous fields of legal scholarship. Children’s rights may be regarded as possessing a specific structural character, since their effective implementation largely depends on the fulfilment of obligations by others, namely parents and public authorities. The best interests of the child, as an independent fundamental principle of children’s rights, cannot be effectively realised unless the child has been provided with an opportunity to be heard and has been adequately informed in advance about the possibility of expressing his or her views.

The child’s right to express views constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of children’s rights[2] and is protected alike by international, European and domestic legal instruments[3]. The exercise of the child’s right to express views presupposes the existence of the child’s capacity to form views, which functions as a procedural precondition in proceedings affecting the child.

The assessment of this capacity has practical consequences. It determines whether the child must be informed of the possibility of expressing views, whether and how the child should be heard, what form of communication is appropriate, and what weight should be attached to the child’s views.

Against this background, the article examines how Hungarian law and judicial practice assess the child’s capacity to form views after the entry into application of Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111, hereinafter referred to as the Brussels IIb Regulation. It argues that Hungarian law should move away from an age-centred understanding of capacity and towards a contextual, decision-specific assessment.

1. The Child’s Right to Be Heard in International and European Family Law

1.1. The Convention on the Rights of the Child

Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in New York on 20 November 1989 (hereinafter: Convention on the Rights of the Child), provides that: “States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.”

The primary objective of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is to promote and protect children’s rights by granting children specific procedural rights in family law proceedings before judicial and administrative authorities, particularly in proceedings concerning contact rights, the child’s residence, or the exercise of parental responsibility.

Nevertheless, the possibility of expressing views must not be restricted solely to judicial or administrative proceedings, since Article 12 of the Convention expressly provides that the child has the right to express his or her views freely in all matters affecting the child.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child also imposes procedural obligations upon courts, administrative authorities and child protection bodies. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasised that the effective exercise of the right to express views cannot be ensured without prior, clear and age-appropriate information. The child must be informed that he or she has the right to form and express views, the manner in which this may be exercised, and the way in which those views will be taken into consideration[4].

Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the child must be regarded as an active and autonomous holder of rights[5]. Pursuant to Article 12 of the Convention, parents must also ensure that the child is able to express views in matters affecting him or her. Furthermore, judicial and administrative proceedings must provide an opportunity for the child concerned to be heard either directly, through a representative, or through an appropriate body, such as a psychologist.

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has further stressed that States are under an obligation to guarantee this right directly and to adopt legislation enabling children to exercise it effectively. At the same time, the Committee has also pointed out that the child has the right not to exercise the opportunity to express views, since the exercise of this right cannot be regarded as an obligation[6].

1.2. The Brussels IIb Regulation

Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (Brussels IIa Regulation) ceased to apply on 1 August 2022 and was replaced by Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (hereinafter: Brussels IIb Regulation).

In accordance with Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 24(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Brussels IIb Regulation requires that children be provided with the opportunity to express their views in proceedings affecting them. Article 21 of the Brussels IIb Regulation is based on Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child when regulating the right of a child capable of forming his or her own views to express those views; however, the Regulation supplements the Convention with two important conceptual elements. Pursuant to the Regulation, courts of the Member States must, in accordance with national law and procedures, ensure that a child capable of forming his or her own views is given a genuine and effective opportunity to express those views freely during the proceedings, either directly or through a representative or an appropriate body[7]. Where the court provides the child with the opportunity to express views, those views must be given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity.

The purpose of this clarification was essentially to ensure that the child is aware of the possibility of expressing views or otherwise making his or her opinion known during the proceedings, even where the parents have failed to inform the child accordingly. Where an in-person hearing of the child is not possible, the court may consider hearing the child through videoconferencing or other communication technologies, provided that the necessary technical means are available[8]. The Regulation does not expressly impose an obligation to hear the child; rather, its primary objective is to ensure that a child capable of forming his or her own views is informed about the possibility of expressing those views.

Pursuant to Article 39(2) of the Brussels IIb Regulation, the recognition of a decision relating to parental responsibility delivered in another Member State may be refused if the decision was given without providing a child capable of forming his or her own views with an opportunity to express those views.

Consequently, failure to comply with the obligation to inform the child may result in serious legal consequences under the Brussels IIb Regulation. Another Member State of the European Union may refuse the recognition and enforcement of a decision where the authorities failed to provide a child capable of forming his or her own views with the opportunity to express those views. Indeed, an application for the recognition and enforcement of a decision relating to parental responsibility in another Member State must be accompanied by the certificate provided for in the relevant Annex to the Regulation. In that certificate, the court must indicate whether the child concerned was capable of forming his or her own views and, if so, whether the child was provided with a genuine and effective opportunity to express those views. If the child was considered incapable of forming views, the court must also indicate the grounds on which such assessment was based[9]. The issuance of such a certificate may become necessary not only in proceedings that are already cross-border in nature at the time of the proceedings, but also in situations where enforcement in another Member State is sought only subsequently[10].

However, the question of who hears the child and by what method remains governed by the national law and procedural rules of the Member States[11]. It must also be emphasised that the hearing of the child constitutes a right of the child rather than an absolute obligation. The Regulation treats the hearing of the child as a fundamental right. Nevertheless, while certain Member States regard the child’s right to express views as a substantive right, others approach it primarily as a procedural right[12].

2. The Conceptual Framework of the Child’s Capacity to Form Views

2.1. Conceptual Uncertainty Surrounding the Child’s Capacity to Form Views

Neither international nor European legal instruments provide a definition of the child’s capacity to form views. The concept is defined neither by the Convention on the Rights of the Child nor by the Brussels IIb Regulation, and no generally applicable standards have been developed. Yet the conceptual delineation of this capacity is of fundamental importance for the effective exercise of the child’s right to express views and the child’s right to be informed. In my view, the proper interpretation and application of the child’s capacity to form views serves not only as a guarantee of the effective exercise of the minor child’s right to express views, but also as an essential safeguard for the realisation of the best interests of the child.

Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognises the right of the child who is capable of forming his or her own views to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child. The child’s views must be given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity. The Convention does not define the concept of capacity to form views, nor does it determine the age from which a child should be regarded as capable of forming such views. This assessment must therefore be made in each individual case by the competent court or authority, without reliance on a rigid age threshold, taking into account the child’s age, intellectual maturity and personal circumstances[13].

According to General Comment No. 12, adopted by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2009, no age limit should be set in relation to the child’s capacity to form views. It cannot be presumed, in respect of a child of any age, that he or she is incapable of expressing views or taking a position. While the right to express views must be guaranteed, the potential harmful effects associated with its exercise must also be prevented. Accordingly, the child must be provided with appropriate assistance and support when exercising this right[14].

As foreign legal practice is not uniform as to when a child may be regarded as capable of forming views, Hungarian legal scholarship has also developed divergent approaches to the interpretation of the concept[15]. Tímea Barzó places the emphasis on the child’s ability to form an opinion[16]. In her view, the concept refers to the child’s ability, in matters affecting him or her and requiring a decision, to form and express an independent opinion free from undue influence. Barzó characterises this capacity as situational, since it depends on the specific circumstances of the case.

From a child-rights-based perspective, Orsolya Szeibert emphasises that the key concept in this context is the child’s “evolving capacities”. In her view, the establishment of any age threshold is unnecessary[17]. Traditional age-based approaches to the child’s capacity to form views have become outdated; instead, emphasis should be placed on the child’s evolving capacities. In line with the position of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Szeibert also argues that the capacity to form views should be presumed in respect of every child[18].

According to Ildikó Bereczki, the child’s capacity to form views depends not only on age and maturity, but also on a range of further factors. These include intellectual and emotional capacities, family and social circumstances, and the parents’ level of education and awareness, all of which may influence the child’s abilities and capacity for self-assertion[19].

It follows that the doctrinal approaches to the concept are far from uniform and, indeed, differ significantly. This raises the question whether it is necessary, or even possible, to define the child’s capacity to form views at statutory level. The issue is particularly relevant because the English versions of both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Brussels IIb Regulation refer to the child’s ability to form and express views, which does not fully correspond to the Hungarian term ítélőképesség used in the Hungarian translation[20]. The concept of ítélőképesség entered the Hungarian legal framework with the promulgation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and gradually became embedded in Hungarian law. It is therefore no coincidence that the Brussels IIb Regulation also refrains from defining the concept. Consequently, the assessment and interpretation of the child’s capacity to form views continue to pose significant challenges for legislators and legal practitioners in the Member States.

2.2. The Assessment of the Child’s Capacity to Form Views in Hungarian Legislation

In Hungary, the concept of the child’s capacity to form views is surrounded by both legislative and interpretative uncertainty, despite the fact that the term plays an important role in the effective exercise of the child’s right to express views and has become embedded in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Brussels IIb Regulation, other international and European instruments, as well as in the Hungarian legal framework.

In Hungary, the concept of the child’s capacity to form views once again became the subject of scholarly and practical legal discourse following the amendment, with effect from 1 August 2022, of Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code, hereinafter: Civil Code. Following the entry into application of the Brussels IIb Regulation on 1 August 2022, the Hungarian legislature amended Section 4:171(4) of the Civil Code and Section 128 of Act XXXI of 1997 on the Protection of Children and Guardianship Administration, hereinafter: Child Protection Act. As a result, courts, in proceedings concerning parental responsibility, and guardianship authorities, in guardianship proceedings, are required to inform a child capable of forming his or her own views[21].

Compared with the previous legal framework, the Family Law Book of the Civil Code provides more effective protection for the enforcement of children’s rights[22]. At the level of principle, the Civil Code provides, at the beginning of the Family Law Book, that the interests and rights of the child shall be afforded enhanced protection[23]. However, the rights and interests of the child cannot be assessed in isolation; family interests must also be taken into account, and the decision-making process must aim to identify the solution most favourable to the child[24].

In order to implement the Brussels IIb Regulation, the Hungarian legislature amended Section 4:171(4) of the Civil Code, with effect from 1 August 2022, by Act LXII of 2021 on International Judicial Cooperation in Matters of Parental Responsibility. This provision concerns the hearing of the child and provides that “in the course of the proceedings, the court shall, unless there is an unavoidable obstacle, hear both parents and inform the child capable of forming his or her own views.”[25]

The Child Protection Act was likewise amended as a consequence of the Brussels IIb Regulation. Pursuant to Section 128(1) of that Act, “in guardianship proceedings, the child capable of forming his or her own views shall be informed of the opportunity to express his or her views, with simultaneous notification of the legal representative.”[26]

Accordingly, in proceedings before courts, the Civil Code, and in guardianship proceedings, the Child Protection Act, impose a general obligation on courts and guardianship authorities to inform the child capable of forming his or her own views.

The Hungarian legislature ensures the child’s right to express views before a court in the substantive law code, namely the Civil Code, and regards this right not as a procedural right but as a substantive right. At the same time, the procedural legislation also contains provisions on the hearing of a minor child. In my view, this legislative solution is to be supported, since the guarantee of the child’s right to express views, as a children’s right, is not primarily a matter for procedural legislation. By contrast, the conduct of the hearing, the manner in which it is carried out, and the child’s procedural rights are matters belonging to procedural law.

Accordingly, Section 473(1) of Act CXXX of 2016 on the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter: Code of Civil Procedure, provides that, where the court decides to hear the minor child as an interested person in the proceedings, it shall, where justified, appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor ex officio. The procedural legislation, however, does not define what constitutes a justified case. Interestingly, the Code of Civil Procedure does not regulate the hearing of minor children in general terms. Instead, among the common rules applicable to proceedings concerning parental responsibility and contact, it provides that the hearing of the minor must take place in an appropriate atmosphere, in a manner understandable to the child and with due regard to the child’s age and maturity[27]. A minor under the age of fourteen is summoned through his or her legal representative, whereas a minor who has reached the age of fourteen is summoned directly, with the legal representative being notified[28].

Not only courts but also parents have obligations in respect of a child capable of forming his or her own views. Parents must ensure that their child, where capable of forming views, is able to express his or her views during the preparation of decisions affecting him or her, and they must give due weight to the child’s views in accordance with the child’s age and maturity[29].

At first sight, the obligation of courts and guardianship authorities to inform the child, introduced as a result of the Brussels IIb Regulation, may appear to be a procedural rule. Nevertheless, the legislature placed it in the substantive law code, namely the Civil Code, and did not treat it as a procedural rule. In light of the international and European regulation of children’s rights, this legislative approach is understandable. The child has not only the right to express views but also the right to receive information; the right to information is one of the constituent elements of the right to participate. It is therefore much more properly understood as a children’s right than as a merely procedural issue preceding the hearing. For this reason, I agree with the legislative technique whereby the obligation of courts to inform the child of the possibility of expressing views is laid down in the substantive law code[30].

In accordance with international instruments, the Hungarian legislature imposes the obligation of guardianship authorities and courts to inform the child only in relation to a child capable of forming his or her own views. Like the international instruments, neither the Hungarian Civil Code, nor the Child Protection Act, nor even the Code of Civil Procedure defines what is meant by capacity to form views. The only legal definition of a child capable of forming his or her own views is contained in Section 2(a) of Government Decree No 149/1997 (IX.10.) on Guardianship Authorities and Child Protection and Guardianship Proceedings. According to that provision, such a child is “a minor who, according to his or her age and intellectual and emotional development, is capable, during the hearing, of understanding the essential content of the facts and decisions affecting him or her and of appreciating their foreseeable consequences.”[31]

It should be emphasised that the scope of the Government Decree extends to guardianship proceedings and that the definition is laid down at the level of a government decree. Consequently, the interpretation provided by the Government Decree is not binding on courts. Nevertheless, in interpreting the concept of the child’s capacity to form views, which is not defined at statutory level in the Civil Code, judicial decisions regularly refer to the definition contained in Section 2 of the Government Decree[32].

The definition of the child’s capacity to form views, introduced in the Government Decree in 1997, has become outdated. I agree with those views according to which the definition contained in Section 2 of the Government Decree is insufficiently precise, is not in harmony with a child-rights-based approach, and sets an excessively high standard[33]. The assessment of the child’s capacity to form views is not a simple matter; rather, it is a complex question that must be evaluated individually by the legal practitioner in each case, and age must not be treated as the decisive factor in that assessment[34].

2.3. The Assessment of the Child’s Capacity to Form Views in Hungarian Judicial Practice

Since the entry into application of the Brussels IIb Regulation, Hungarian judicial practice has paid particular attention, in connection with Section 4:171(4) of the Civil Code, to the concept of the child’s capacity to form views, the manner and content of the obligation to inform the child of the possibility of expressing views, the hearing of the child, and the evaluation of the child’s views.

Although forensic psychological experts may, in certain cases, express an opinion in their expert reports on the child’s capacity to form views, the assessment of such capacity is a question of law and not a psychological expert issue[35].

Guideline No 17 on the criteria relating to the placement of children, which is no longer applicable under the Civil Code currently in force[36], also defined the concept of capacity to form views. It stated that a child may be regarded as capable of forming views where, having regard to his or her age and circumstances, he or she is able to form an independent opinion free from undue influence. Accordingly, decisions of the Kúria may also be found in which, relying on Guideline No 17, the Court held that a child may be regarded as capable of forming views where, by reason of his or her age and circumstances, he or she is able to form an independent opinion free from undue influence, the assessment of which falls within the discretionary power of the court[37].

In many cases, an approach based on the conceptual definition contained in the Government Decree on Guardianship Authorities and Child Protection and Guardianship Proceedings may be identified. According to this approach, a child is capable of forming views if, in accordance with his or her age and intellectual and emotional development, he or she is able, during the hearing, to understand the essential content of the facts and decisions affecting him or her and to appreciate their foreseeable consequences. At the same time, judicial practice has also begun to emphasise that the child’s capacity to form views is not determined exclusively by age, but must always be assessed in light of the specific circumstances of the individual case[38]. Indeed, in one case the Kúria held that, when examining the child’s capacity to form views, the court must take into account the concrete circumstances of the case and not merely the child’s age[39].

Recent case-law places considerable emphasis on the hearing of the child and underlines that, in proceedings concerning the regulation of parental responsibility, the court must evaluate the expressed will of the minor child. This may be dispensed with only where the child was not capable of forming views at the time of making the statement. The existence of the child’s capacity to form views must be examined by the court individually in every case, and age must not be regarded as the decisive factor in that assessment[40].

In one case, the Kúria found the omission of the hearing of a child capable of forming views to be unlawful[41], and emphasised that the child’s capacity to form views cannot be inferred solely from the child’s age[42]. In another case concerning children aged eight and six, the Kúria held that the question whether the children were capable of forming views could only be decided after their direct hearing[43].

In a case concerning an eleven-year-old child, in which the child had been heard only through an expert and not directly by the court, the Kúria emphasised that in the repeated proceedings the court was required to hear the child and, on the basis of that hearing, to determine whether the child had reached such a level of maturity that his or her views could be taken into account. If it is established that the child is capable of forming views and that his or her opinion was not essentially the result of parental influence, the claim must be adjudicated with due evaluation of the child’s views, since an eleven-year-old child may already be capable of forming views[44].

By contrast, in another case, where the child was also eleven years old at the time of the hearing, the Kúria held that the lower courts had reasonably concluded that the child had not reached the level of maturity at which his or her views could be taken into account, and that the influence exerted by the respondent was clearly perceptible; consequently, the child was not regarded as capable of forming views[45].

As regards the method of hearing the child, the Kúria pointed out that the indirect hearing of the child through an expert and the direct hearing of the child by the court are equivalent methods of hearing. There is no rule of substantive or procedural law which would preclude the parallel or successive application of these methods[46]. The Court further emphasised that the direct hearing of the child, depending of course on the child’s age and willingness, may in many cases provide the court with additional information.

In several individual decisions, the Kúria has held that the child’s statement must be evaluated in conjunction with the other evidence in the case. It must be examined whether the child is genuinely capable of forming views, that is, whether he or she is able to express an independent opinion free from undue influence in relation to the particular matter at issue. Even where the child has reached the age of fourteen, his or her position does not automatically acquire decisive significance for the adjudication of the case, nor does it justify disregarding the other evidence[47].

The Kúria also found a final judgment to be unlawful on the ground that it failed properly to evaluate the views of children aged fourteen and nine[48]. The Court emphasised that the second-instance court had assessed the child’s statement in a one-sided manner, had highlighted only certain elements of it, and had disregarded the statement not on the basis of an overall assessment but by relying on incidental considerations. Such an approach infringes the child’s right to express views.

Whether a child possesses the capacity to form views can be determined only on the basis of the child’s hearing and the subsequent assessment of all relevant circumstances[49]. This raises a legitimate question: if the court can determine whether the child is capable of forming views only as a result of the proceedings and after weighing all the relevant circumstances, at what stage of the proceedings, and in which cases, must courts comply with their obligation to inform the child? Since the child’s capacity to form views cannot be linked to age, the court acts properly if it sends the notification to every child. At most, very young children and infants may constitute exceptions to this approach. Accordingly, the widest possible scope of notification should be ensured for the children concerned, informing them that they may request to be heard. The court or guardianship authority will be in a position genuinely to assess the child’s capacity to form views, and the extent to which the child’s statement may be taken into account in the decision-making process, only after hearing the child[50]. It is nevertheless advisable for the judge, even before hearing the child, to obtain information — for instance during the personal hearing of the parents — concerning the child’s personality, maturity and characteristics, in order to be better placed to determine whether the child is capable of forming views.

Conclusion

The analysis has demonstrated that neither international and European instruments, including the Brussels IIb Regulation, nor Hungarian legislation — with the exception of the Government Decree on Guardianship Authorities and Child Protection and Guardianship Proceedings — define the concept of the child’s capacity to form views, although the guarantee and effective exercise of the child’s right to express views depend on the proper interpretation of that capacity.

The question may legitimately arise whether it is necessary to define the concept of the child’s capacity to form views at statutory level and to establish age thresholds, thereby restricting the discretion of legal practitioners and the flexibility of existing practice. This article does not support the view that the child’s capacity to form views should be defined by statute. It is no coincidence that international and European lawmakers have also adopted a cautious approach in this regard. In my view, no statutory definition is required; rather, general criteria should be developed in legal practice to assist courts and authorities in assessing the child’s capacity to form views in individual cases.

The child’s capacity to form views is a subjective and situational concept which must be assessed individually in the concrete case. Similar to the concept of fault capacity, the same minor child may be capable of forming views in relation to one decision, while not yet possessing such capacity in relation to another. The child’s capacity to form views is not a general and abstract attribute attached to the child as such; rather, it is decision-specific, that is, linked to the particular decision-making situation and to the specific issue arising in the individual case. From a child-rights-based perspective, it is necessary to move beyond the earlier approach according to which the child’s capacity to form views is determined primarily by age. Greater emphasis should instead be placed on the child’s individual decision-making and opinion-forming abilities in the concrete case. Age should primarily be taken into account not in determining whether the child is capable of forming views, but in assessing the weight to be attached to the views expressed by a child who is capable of forming such views.

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[1] Katonáné Pehr, E (2022). A gyermeki jogok védelme a gyermekjogi rendszerben [The Protection of Children’s Rights within the Children’s Rights Framework]. In: Filó, E and Katonáné Pehr, E (eds). Gyermeki jogok, szülői felelősség és gyermekvédelem [Children’s Rights, Parental Responsibility and Child Protection]. Budapest: ORAC, pp. 67–68.
[2] Bereczki, I (2021). Gyermeki jogok a szülői felelősségről szóló nemzetközi magánjogi szabályozás perspektívájából [Children’s Rights from the Perspective of Private International Law Regulation on Parental Responsibility]. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer, p. 42.
[3] See, for example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in New York on 20 November 1989, the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights of 1996, the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice (17 November 2010), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the Brussels IIb Regulation.
[4] Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 12 (2009). Available here. Accessed on 1st of March, 2026.
[5] Szeibert, O. (2019). A gyermek meghallgatása/véleménye, a gyermektartás, az élettárs szülők helyzete és az ötéves Ptk. – vitatható gyakorlatok [The Hearing/Opinion of the Child, Child Maintenance, the Situation of Cohabiting Parents and Controversial Practices after Five Years of the Civil Code]. Családi Jog, 2019(3), p. 3.
[6] Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 12 (2009). Available here. Accessed on 1st of March, 2026.
[7] Wopera, Zs (2023). A Brüsszel IIb rendelet kommentárja [Commentary on the Brussels IIb Regulation]. Budapest: ORAC, p. 163.
[8] Brussels IIb Regulation, Recital (53).
[9] Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111, Article 39(2), Annexes III and V.
[10] Gyengéné Nagy, M (2021). A megújulás küszöbén. A joggyakorlat hatása az átdolgozott Brüsszel IIa rendeletre [On the Threshold of Renewal: The Impact of Judicial Practice on the Recast Brussels IIa Regulation]. Családi Jog, 2021(4), p. 5.
[11] Brussels IIb Regulation, Recital (57).
[12] Molnár, S (2023). Brüsszel IIb rendelet: a gyermek érdekének elsődlegességének érvényesülése – különös figyelemmel a meghallgatásra [The Brussels IIb Regulation: The Principle of the Best Interests of the Child, with Particular Regard to the Hearing of the Child]. Iustum Aequum Salutare, 2023(3), p. 27.
[13] Fehérné Gaál, T (2016). Gondolatok a kiskorú gyermek véleménynyilvánításának és meghallgatásának elkerülhetetlenségéről a szülői felelősséget érintő perekben a Budapest Környéki Törvényszék és területéhez tartozó járásbíróságok gyakorlata alapján [Reflections on the Inevitability of the Minor Child’s Expression of Views and Hearing in Proceedings Concerning Parental Responsibility, Based on the Practice of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court and the District Courts within Its Territorial Jurisdiction]. Családi Jog, 2016(2), p. 7.
[14] General Comment No. 12.
[15] Darnót, S (2017). A gyermek meghallgatása családjogi perekben – interjúk alapján, különös tekintettel a jogalkalmazási eltérésekre [The Hearing of the Child in Family Law Proceedings: Based on Interviews, with Particular Regard to Differences in Legal Practice]. Családi Jog, 2017(4), p. 20.
[16] Barzó, T (2018). Az ember mint jogalany [The Human Person as a Legal Subject]. In: Barzó, T and Papp, T (eds). Civilisztika I.: Általános tanok – Személyek joga – Szellemi alkotások joga [Civil Law I: General Principles – Law of Persons – Intellectual Property Law]. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 106.
[17] Szeibert, O (2019), op. cit., p. 3.
[18] Szeibert, O (2025). Ptk. 4:171. § [Section 4:171 of the Civil Code]. In: Gárdos, P and Vékás, L (eds). Nagykommentár a Polgári Törvénykönyvről szóló 2013. évi V. törvényhez [Comprehensive Commentary on Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code]. Version as of 20 June 2025, Jogtár electronic edition.
[19] Bereczki, I (2021), op. cit., p. 272.
[20] The English versions of Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 21 of the Brussels IIb Regulation use the expression “the child who is capable of forming his or her own views”, which has been translated into Hungarian by using the term ítélőképesség.
[21] Act LXII of 2021 on International Judicial Cooperation in Matters of Parental Responsibility, Sections 45 and 47.
[22] Fazekas, Á (2016). A gyermeki jogok érvényesülése az új Polgári Törvénykönyv Családjogi Könyvében [The Enforcement of Children’s Rights in the Family Law Book of the New Civil Code]. Pro Futuro, 2016(2), p. 58.
[23] Civil Code, Section 4:2.
[24] Barzó, T (2019). A gyermek érdekének védelmét erősítő családjogi alapelv érvényesülésében felmerülő ellentmondások [Contradictions Arising in the Enforcement of the Family Law Principle Strengthening the Protection of the Child’s Interests]. In: Auer, Á and Dúl, J (eds). Opuscula Civilia 2016–2017. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 36.
[25] Civil Code, Section 4:171(4).
[26] Child Protection Act, Section 128(1).
[27] Code of Civil Procedure, Section 473(3).
[28] Code of Civil Procedure, Section 473(2).
[29] Civil Code, Section 4:148.
[30] Bereczki, I (2022). A gyermek tájékoztatáshoz való joga – kölcsönös elismerés? [The Child’s Right to Information – Mutual Recognition?]. In: Nemessányi, Z (ed). Nemzetközi magánjogi évkönyv [Yearbook of Private International Law]. Budapest: HVG-ORAC, p. 127.
[31] Government Decree No 149/1997 (IX.10.) on Guardianship Authorities and Child Protection and Guardianship Proceedings, Section 2(a).
[32] Szeibert, O (2025), op. cit.
[33] Szeibert, O (2025), op. cit.
[34] Völcsey, B (ed) (2025). Kompakt kommentár a bírósági polgári nemperes eljárásokban alkalmazandó szabályokról, valamint egyes bírósági nemperes eljárásokról szóló 2017. évi CXVIII. törvényhez [Concise Commentary on the Rules Applicable in Civil Non-Contentious Judicial Proceedings and on Certain Judicial Non-Contentious Proceedings]. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer Hungary, Jogtár electronic edition.
[35] EH 2011.2318; Kúria, Pfv.20.666/2020/11.
[36] 1/2024. Polgári Jogegységi Határozat [Civil Uniformity Decision No 1/2024] held that Guideline No 17 is no longer applicable under the Civil Code; however, it also emphasised that the legal reasoning, arguments and statements of principle contained in its reasoning may continue to be taken into account.
[37] Kúria, Pfv.20900/2021/13; BH 1996.480.
[38] Kúria, Pfv.II.22.039/2016.
[39] Kúria, Kfv.37.714/2022/6.
[40] BH 2019.298.
[41] Kúria, Pfv.II.20.471/2018.
[42] BH 2010.123; EBH 2011.2318.
[43] Kúria, Pfv.II.22.039/2018.
[44] Kúria, Pfv.II.20.609/2019.
[45] Kúria, Pfv.II.21.096/2017.
[46] Kúria, Pfv.20.666/2020/11.
[47] Kúria, Pfv.21.555/2018/4.
[48] Kúria, Pfv.20.982/2021.
[49] Ádámkó, V (2015). Az ítélőképessége birtokában levő gyermek véleményének meghallgatása – különös tekintettel a gyermekelhelyezésre [The Hearing of the Views of the Child Capable of Forming Views, with Particular Regard to Child Placement]. Családi Jog, 2015(3), p. 10.
[50] Explanatory Memorandum to Act LXII of 2021 on International Judicial Cooperation in Matters of Parental Responsibility.

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Nelli Varga, PhD
Assistant Professor, University of Debrecen, Faculty of Law